Consumers respond favorably to advertising cuts and correctly identify quality. Hence, modest advertising may signal high quality.
Introduction
We provide an equilibrium analysis of a model in which firms with high-quality products strategically choose to cut advertising expenditures, resulting in loss of market volume, to credibly signal their quality. Potential customers who observe advertising expenditures respond positively to these advertising cuts and correctly identify the product type. This result is in contrast to most of the existing literature on signalling games.
The main result of the signalling games literature is that a strong type of player (the one who wishes to reveal his identity) sends a signal that is stronger than the signal he would have sent had there been no doubt as to his identity. Thus, the strong type widens the gap between his signal and the full-information signal of the weak type. This relies on the common assumption, known as the single-crossing condition (SCC) , that strengthening the signal is costlier for the weak type than for the strong type.
This idea was first introduced by Spence (1974) in a setting where "overinvestment" in education serves as a signal of productivity.
1 To name just a few, other models view capital structure as a signal of an entrepreneur's quality (Ross, 1977) , warranties as a signal of product quality (Grossman, 1981) , low price as a signal of low production costs (Milgrom and Roberts, for the high-quality producer to incur a cost that might reveal his type. 10 He can set a high firstperiod price and thereby sacrifice volume permanently.
11 Alternatively, he can burn a lot of money in an introductory advertising campaign. The equilibrium mix of the two signalling instruments, of course, depends on the specifics of the given market under scrutiny. 12 In our model, there is an alternative way for the high-quality producer to incur a cost that might reveal his type. He may choose a modest introductory advertising outlay and thereby sacrifice volume permanently (since he is reaching fewer potential buyers). That this can be an equilibrium phenomenon for a "natural" parameter constellation is our main message.
Tentatively, this may also explain the mixed empirical evidence of Caves and Greene (1996) . For a cross-section of industries, the ambiguous relationship between advertising and quality in the pooled sample may simply reflect that in some industries, modest advertising is signalling quality, while in others quality is signalled by extensive advertising, and that this is not picked up by any of the explanatory variables. To test our predictions on the relationship between advertising expenditures and quality, control should be made for the key variables emphasized above (the ratio of the markups and the fraction of indifferent individuals). 13 In addition, signal reversal is unlikely to arise if observed advertising is largely dissipative, since low levels of dissipative advertising cannot possibly identify high quality. So if information can be obtained on the relationship between markups and quality and on the nature of advertising, then the main predictions of this article are readily testable.
From an empirical perspective, signal reversal in the sense of this article is more likely to be observed for certain durables such as consumer electronics, household whiteware, and computer hardware than for information goods such as computer software (for example, upgrades), business news and data, etc. The main reason for this is that the unit costs of producing information goods are very low, irrespective of quality (once first-version sunk costs have been incurred). Hence, the ratio of markups between high and low quality for information goods is typically high, pulling us toward the standard SCC case where high quality is signalled by extensive advertising.
14 In contrast, for many consumer durables, marginal costs are significant and closely tied to quality. If willingness-to-pay increases only moderately with quality, then we would expect to observe high-quality brands being advertised modestly during the introductory phase. Note well what this statement is saying: High-quality products are advertised modestly compared to lower-quality products within the same product category. We are not saying that the product category as a whole (e.g., computer hardware) is advertised modestly. To put this empirical conjecture slightly differently, if gradual and modest quality improvements from one product generation to the next are associated with nontrivial cost increases, then new versions of high-quality products are likely to be advertised modestly.
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A slight reinterpretation of our model suggests that restaurants might fit into our framework. High-quality restaurants are very often found in obscure locations off the main street or in small villages, whereas lower-quality outlets such as chain restaurants and fast-food restaurants are much more conspicuously located at expensive main street addresses. So if location is interpreted as costly and partly informative advertising, then this appears to be a case where quality is signalled by modest advertising outlays.
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The article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and the full-information (or myopic) benchmark. Section 3 analyzes separating equilibria, and Section 4 focuses on signal reversal. Section 5 provides a robust example of signal reversal. In Section 6 we make a few concluding remarks. The Appendix contains most of the proofs.
The model
A new product is introduced into the market by a monopolist firm. The quality of the product is either "high" (H ) or "low" (L), and this is private information of the firm. Production costs are c H (q) and c L (q) where q is the output level. Consumers can discover the quality of the product only if they purchase and use it (i.e., the product launched by the firm is an experience good whose quality is perfectly inferred upon use). We assume the following. Assumption 1. There are two constants c H and c L , such that c L < c H and c t (q) = c t q, t ∈ {H, L}.
The marginal costs are constant and the unit cost of the high-quality product exceeds that of the low-quality product. The linearity assumption is not crucial. It enables us to find explicit and relatively simple conditions for the signal reversal phenomenon to occur. We could, however, demonstrate our result with quite general cost functions. Actually, if the technology exhibits diseconomies of scale, then the larger the advertising level, the larger the output and, hence, the average cost. Consequently, the high-quality firm may find it more advantageous to separate itself from the low-quality firm by cutting advertising rather than by exaggerating advertising. Therefore, it is more challenging (while mathematically simpler) to demonstrate the results with a constant per-unit cost function.
There is a continuum of individuals represented by the unit interval [0, 1]. They are divided into two types: "fastidious" (F) and "indifferent" (I ) in the proportions λ and 1 − λ, respectively. Each fastidious individual is willing to pay w F H and w F L per unit of the high-quality and low-quality goods, respectively. Similarly, each indifferent individual is willing to pay w I H and w I L for the high-quality and low-quality goods, respectively. We make the following assumption.
Essentially this combines two assumptions. A fastidious customer is willing to pay more for a high-quality good and willing to pay less for a low-quality good. Thus, the willingness-to-pay of a fastidious individual is more sensitive to quality than that of an indifferent individual.
The interaction between the firm and the potential customers can be described as follows. In the first period, individuals become aware of the product through introductory advertising. The firm chooses the product price, p 1 , and the amount of advertising expenditure, x. As a result of the advertising, a proportion µ(x) of individuals becomes aware of the product. As in most of the literature, it is assumed that x is known to every individual who becomes aware of the product. 17 We make the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The function µ(x) is differentiable, strictly concave, and increasing. In addition, µ(0) = 0 and µ(x) → 1 as x → ∞.
Thus, the proportion of customers who are exposed to the product increases with the level of advertising expenditures, but at a diminishing rate. With no advertising, this proportion is zero, and it increases to one as the advertising expenditures grow indefinitely. 16 Main street addresses are more expensive, and a location on main street will (randomly) inform more people about the existence of a particular restaurant. Hence, location formally plays the same role as advertising in our model. 17 It is sufficient that exposed individuals have an estimate of x, based on, for example, the number of times that advertisements are observed, their size, or their broadcasting duration. Most models assume that advertising expenditures are commonly known. One exception is Hertzendorf (1993) , who assumes that consumers estimate x from the number of advertisements observed.
In the second period, the price, p 2 , may change, but there is no further advertising. It is assumed that every individual buys either zero or one unit in each period.
To simplify the analysis and focus on the advertising expenditure as the relevant signal, we make two further assumptions.
Thus, the willingness of a fastidious individual to pay for the low-quality product falls short of its cost. This asserts that the low-quality firm will lose by lowering its price from w I L to w F L in order to sell the product to the fastidious individuals as well. In contrast, the willingness of an indifferent individual to pay is sufficient to cover the costs of both qualities. We note that Assumptions 2 and 4 combine to
which we shall refer to repeatedly.
. This condition clearly implies that λ < 1/2. Assumption 5 basically asserts that the highquality firm prefers to set the price at w I L , even if this confuses the consumers into believing that its type is L, rather than setting the price at w We shall not specify the probability of the firm's type, since this is irrelevant for the computation of separating equilibria (provided that the types of the individuals are selected independently of the types of the firm). Finally, for simplicity we abstract from discounting between the two periods. This has no effect on our results.
Having outlined the model, we can state four lemmas that play an important role in the analysis. These lemmas state the payoffs of the two firm types as functions of x, for particular first-period prices and consumer beliefs following these prices. These payoffs are used repeatedly in Section 3, where we outline the requirements for a strategy profile to constitute a separating equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let π L L (x) be the profits of the low-quality firm, if it spends x on advertising, sets the first-period price at w I L , and every exposed individual in the first-period correctly identifies its type. Then
Proof. By (1), only indifferent individuals buy in the first period, and the first-period profits are
We argue that in the second period the firm sets the same price, w 
The proofs of the next three lemmas use similar arguments, and they appear in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.
Let π H H (x) be the profits of the high-quality firm, if it spends x on advertising, sets the first-period price at w I H , and every exposed individual correctly identifies its type. Then
be the profits of the low-quality firm if it spends x on advertising, sets the first-period price at w I H , and succeeds in fooling every exposed individual in the first period into believing that the product is of high quality. Then
be the profits of the high-quality firm, if it spends x on advertising, sets the first period price at w I L , and every exposed individual incorrectly believes in the first period that the quality is low.
for all x > 0 and t ∈ {H, L}, which means that the firm is better off being perceived as a high-quality firm, irrespective of its true type. By Assumptions 1 and 3, it is immediate that π tτ (x) is strictly concave, t, τ ∈ {H, L}, and since π tτ (0) = 0 and π tτ (x) → −∞ as x → ∞, we conclude that π tτ has a single peak.
Next we briefly turn to the full-information or myopic benchmark. As mentioned above, the term myopic refers to the case where there is no uncertainty about the quality offered for sale. It does not imply that all consumers are aware of the existence of the product, but whoever is aware of the product knows its quality whether he makes a purchase or not. First, consider the low-quality firm. Under the hypothetical full-information case, it clearly makes no sense for the low-quality firm to attempt to sell to fastidious individuals, since w F L < c L . It follows that it is optimal for the firm to set the price in both periods equal to the willingness of indifferent individuals to pay for the low quality. That is,
, where m stands for "myopic." Given these prices, only the exposed indifferent individuals buy, and the profits of the low-quality firm as a function of x are
Next, consider the high-quality firm. By Assumption 5, the proportion of indifferent individuals is significant, and the willingness-to-pay of the fastidious individuals is not compensatively large. Consequently, the high-quality firm makes sure not to miss out on the purchases of the indifferent individuals. Therefore, it sets the price at w I H and sells to both types of individuals. That is,
This has a unique interior maximizer,
To ensure that the full-information profits are strictly positive for both types of the firm, that is, π tt (x m t ) > 0, t ∈ {H, L}, we add the following assumption.
}.
, and for later reference,
To end this section, we can further explain the assumptions with direct reference to (1) and the full-information benchmark. Note first that c H < w I L (see Assumption 4) implies that indifferent individuals are potentially valuable to both types of the firm, since their willingness-to-pay exceeds unit costs. This, together with Assumption 5, means that a high-quality firm will never choose to become an "up-market" firm serving only a limited segment of potential customers. Under the alternative assumption c H ≥ w I L , Assumption 5 would necessarily be violated for any λ, and the high-quality firm would be more likely to simply ignore the indifferent individuals.
Given the assumptions, a distinguishing feature of the full-information case is that the lowquality firm only serves the indifferent individuals, whereas the high-quality firm serves both types of consumers. We want to retain this as a feature of the equilibrium, when consumer information is incomplete. Hence we have the assumption w F L < c L < c H (see Assumption 4), that is, the low-quality firm is unable to make money from fastidious individuals once its identity has been revealed.
In terms of descriptive relevance, (1) is intended to capture the following. First, consumers are heterogeneous. Second, there are two distinct classes of consumers. This could be thought of as, e.g., existing users and new users of an established type of product (cars, flat-screen TVs, DVD equipment, digital scanners, etc.) or professional and ordinary users. In the former case, existing users might be willing to pay only a very modest amount, w F L , for a new version that adds modest value (a "low-quality" update), 18 whereas they might be willing to pay a substantial amount, w 
Separating equilibrium
We study sequential pure-strategy separating equilibria (SSE), where the two types of the firm separate themselves in the first period. That is, the signals ( p t , x t ) is the first-period price and advertising expenditures of the t-type firm, t ∈ {H, L}. Furthermore, to sharpen the results we focus on equilibrium points that are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) . We denote them by SSSE (sensible sequential pure-strategy separating equilibria).
In every separating equilibrium, exposed individuals identify the quality of the product in the first period. They infer that it is of high quality if they observe the signal ( p 1 H , x H ), and that it is of low quality if the signal is ( p 1 L , x L ). It follows immediately that the low-quality firm chooses the full-information price,
We show below (see Proposition 3) that for a certain region of the parameters, the price of the high-quality firm is p
That is, the price of the high-quality firm is undistorted and coincides with the full-information price. But we first find the advertising expenditures of the high-quality firm associated with an SSSE under the assumption that p
Consider the set X , consisting of all x such that the low-quality firm finds it unattractive to spend x on advertising, even if by doing so it succeeds in fooling the exposed individuals about its type. Note that the low-quality firm may fool the consumers only if it sets the first-period price at p
(see Lemmas 1 and 3 above). Suppose now that y / ∈ X . Then in every SSE, the fastidious individuals who are exposed to the product are willing to pay at most w 
Hence, for every advertising expenditure y / ∈ X , the high-quality firm sets the price w I L (see (1) and Assumption 5) and obtains the payoff π H L (y). Therefore, x H must satisfy
(see Lemmas 2 and 4 above). That is, the high-quality firm should not be better off at any point where the exposed individuals wrongly identify its type. Finally, at every SSSE, the high-quality firm considers all advertising levels in X where individuals can "sensibly" 19 infer its identity and selects the one that yields the highest profits. That is,
Conditions (4) and (5) are the incentive-compatibility constraints on the high-quality firm. Next, we characterize the set X defined in (3).
Lemma 5.
There exist x and x such that
Proof. See the Appendix.
Having thus characterized the set, X , of advertising expenditures that are dominated from the point of view of the low-quality firm, our next goal is to establish conditions to ensure that
H . These are conditions to allow modest advertising expenditures to signal high quality. In this section we first find conditions that guarantee x H = x or x H = x m H (Lemma 6). Second, we find conditions for which the incentive-compatibility constraints of the high-quality firm are satisfied for x H = x (Propositions 1 and 2). Third, we show that p 1 H = w I H will, indeed, be the price chosen by the high-quality firm under the conditions stated (Proposition 3). Finally, in the next section, where the focus is on signal "reversal," we strengthen these conditions to guarantee that
We first find conditions that guarantee that at every SSSE with p 1 H = w I H , the advertising expenditures of the high-quality firm are smaller than those of the low-quality firm. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 implies that whenever the (unit) markup of the high-quality firm is not too large compared to the markup of the low-quality firm, then the high-quality firm obtains a higher profit 19 Since every x ∈ X is inferior to x m L for the low-quality firm, it is sensible to infer, when observing x ∈ X , that it was selected by the high-quality firm. This inference follows from the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) or the forward induction principle of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . under x than under x. Hence, in that case, the high-quality firm prefers to separate at or below x as opposed to separating at or above x.
What remains in this section is to check the incentive-compatibility condition of the highquality firm given by (4) when
The latter can be written as
To facilitate the exposition, let us first consider the special case without fastidious individuals, λ = 0. In this case the last inequality in (i) of Lemma 6 reduces to (
, the increase in willingness-to-pay for high quality must be less than twice the associated increase in unit costs. We can state the following result. Thus, for this case, incentive compatibility for the high-quality firm is a direct consequence of the assumption
and we need no reference to the properties of µ(x) beyond those captured by Assumption 6. For the general case with fastidious individuals, λ ≥ 0, we need further assumptions about
should be sufficiently small. That is, the payoffs to a high-quality firm that is mistaken for a low-quality firm in the first period should be small. Otherwise there exist advertising expenditures
, and incentive compatibility will be violated. In Section 5 below we provide a fully specified numerical example, in which µ(x) = 1 − e −αx , α > 0, that captures this in terms of conditions on α. Here, we shall formulate a simple sufficient condition in terms only of µ (x) and the parameters of the model. We can state the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that p
, then the incentive-compatibility condition for the high-quality firm, 
, then π H L (x) < 0 (by Lemma 4). Thus, by the strict concavity of µ(x), if hypothetically perceived as a low-quality firm in the first period, the high-quality firm would choose an advertising expenditure x * less than x, and it follows that π H L (x
Thus, for consistency with (ii) of Proposition 2, we require
.
It follows that a necessary condition is
which is just condition (i) of the proposition. This is stronger than
from Lemma 6 whenever λ > 0, but still perfectly consistent with the general specifications of the model. Propositions 1 and 2 provide sufficient conditions for the high-quality firm to credibly signal its type by cutting its advertising level below the equilibrium level of the low-quality firm. These results are obtained under the assumption that p Proposition 3. Suppose that
So if the incentive-compatibility condition holds for the relevant advertising expenditures, and if the ratio of the full-information markups is as required for modest advertising to be preferred by the high-quality firm, then the high-quality firm will choose the full-information price in the first period. The detailed proof appears in the Appendix, but we can briefly sketch the three steps. First, we prove that p H the high-quality firm makes sure not to miss out on the purchases of indifferent individuals. Next, we use the first condition of the proposition, which asserts that the markup of the high-quality firm is not too large compared to that of the low-quality firm. We use it to show that the high-quality firm has no incentive to reduce its price below w
and at the same time to increase its advertising expenditures. The associated increase in the number of buyers (present and future) will not offset the first-period decline in markup and the additional advertising cost. Finally, using the inequality w 
The single-crossing condition and signal reversal
The single-crossing condition (SCC), which is standard in the signalling literature, is introduced mainly to guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium. It may however lead to the exclusion of certain interesting phenomena. 20 Heuristically, the SCC asserts that more aggressive signals are costlier for the weak-type (low-quality) sender than for the strong-type (high-quality) sender, even if the weak-type sender succeeds in fooling the receiver about his type by sending an aggressive signal. The SCC guarantees that in a "sensible" separating equilibrium, the action of the strong-type sender is more aggressive than that of the weak-type sender. In our context, for the case where x m H > x m L , this would mean more generous advertising in the signalling equilibrium by the high-quality firm (contrary to Propositions 1 and 2 above), that is,
Thus, the advertising expenditures of the high-quality firm would be distorted above the full-information level, in the case where this is higher than the full-information level of the low-quality firm.
In our model, the SCC is equivalent to the requirement that π H H (x) − π L H (x) is a monotone increasing function of x when the parameters are such that x m H > x m L . We claim that this is not always the case, especially if c H is sufficiently large relative to c L . The reason is as follows: When the low-quality firm mimics the high-quality firm, it sets the high-quality price. Therefore, the low-quality firm has the higher markup (w I H − c L compared to w I H − c H ). Thus, the low-quality firm has the advantage that it profits from every unit sold more than the high-quality firm. On the other hand, for every additional unit sold in the first period, the high-quality firm sells more than the low-quality firm in the second period, due to repeat purchases. This advantage of the high-quality firm from large advertising expenditures vanishes as (w
First, we strengthen the conditions of Proposition 1 and 2 to allow for the signal reversal phenomenon. 21 We start with a lemma that follows immediately from (2). 
Lemma 7. Suppose that (w
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 3 and Lemma 7.
Q.E.D.
For the general case with fastidious individuals, we can combine Lemma 7 and Propositions 2 and 3 into the following result.
Theorem 2 (signal reversal, λ > 0). Suppose that
Then there exists a unique SSSE outcome with the following properties:
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3 and Lemma 7.
Note that by the concavity of µ(x), we could replace µ (x) in (ii) by µ (0) to obtain a global but more restrictive condition. Also, at this point the reader should recall that condition (ii) of Theorem 2 is a sufficient condition. In the example below we present a case where this condition is not satisfied, yet high quality is still signalled by a modest advertising level.
The upshot of these two results is that the conditions for signal reversal can be satisfied in a proper region of the parameters. 22 The ratio of the full-information markups, (w and an upward distortion of advertising expenditures by the high-quality firm (if anything). Clearly, a necessary condition for signal reversal in the sense of this article is that the ratio of the markups be in an intermediate range:
).
An immediate corollary is the following.
Corollary 1.
If λ is sufficiently small, then signal reversal is consistent with markups that are positively related to quality in the full-information case, that is, (w
Thus, if the fraction of "fastidious" individuals is not too large, then in a proper region of the parameters the model is consistent with the phenomenon of signal reversal and equilibrium markups that are increasing in quality.
Indeed, in the special case without fastidious individuals,
H is equivalent to markups that are increasing in quality, and in this case increasing markups are associated with modest advertising in equilibrium provided that 
Example
To highlight the scope for signalling with a modest amount of advertising in the general case with fastidious individuals, λ > 0, we shall give a fully specified and robust example that gives rise to signal reversal. The example considers two cases. In the first case, both conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied. In the other case, the second condition of Theorem 2 is violated. This is meant to illustrate that this condition is sufficient but not necessary (as we remarked in the discussion above).
Assume that µ(x) = 1 − e −αx , α > 0, which is increasing, strictly concave with µ(0) = 0 and µ(x) → 1 as x → ∞. Also, µ (x) = αe −αx and µ (0) = α. Further, fix the valuations and costs as follows:
Hence, in the example we assume at the outset that the full-information markups are increasing in quality. Finally, assume that λ = 1/10. Given this specification, it is easy to demonstrate that Assumptions 1 through 5 are satisfied. As for Assumption 6, we require α > 5/27, and we shall assume this from now on. To complete the description, we note that the payoffs are as follows: Rather than working out all the details of the example (for that, see Case 2 below), we simply note that if α = 1/5, then
That is, condition ( 
. Hence, the incentivecompatibility condition for the high-quality firm is satisfied and all the conditions for signal reversal are satisfied despite the violation of condition (ii) of Theorem 2. Thus, we have signal reversal:
So with up to at least 10% fastidious individuals (including the special case with no fastidious individuals at all), the example is certainly consistent with markups that are positively related to quality and modest advertising as a signal of high quality.
Remarks. For the special case with homogeneous consumers, an empirical test merely requires ex post information on advertising expenditures, prices, and measures of unit cost across a sample of products and qualities. If markups increase rapidly with quality, we expect high qualities to be associated with large advertising expenditures, while if markups increase moderately (or decrease) with quality, we expect high qualities to be associated with modest advertising expenditures. In addition to the information needed for the special case, empirical testing of the general case with heterogenous consumers requires information on consumers allowing a separation of two types, such as experienced versus first-time buyers or professional versus private users.
A couple of more general comments might be in order at this point. First, it would be valuable in terms of descriptive relevance to extend the modelling of consumer heterogeneity to the case with multiple classes of consumers. Second, our model shares with the existing literature on quality signalling the feature that the firm has a monopoly. Very little theoretical work has been done on quality signalling by competing oligopolistic firms. This poses a severe problem for empirical testing based on data collected from oligopolistic industries, since it is unclear whether 23 Increasing α above 1/4 will increase x * compared to x m L , and for α sufficiently large the incentive-compatibility condition of the high-quality firm will be violated. the main qualitative conclusions for the monopoly case survive the introduction of competition between firms.
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Concluding remarks
To summarize, we have shown that a high-quality firm may, indeed, choose to signal its identity by lowering introductory advertising expenditures to a level below that of the low-quality firm. We refer to this as signal reversal, if under full information the high-quality firm would have chosen a higher level of advertising than the low-quality firm. Also, this phenomenon is consistent with a positive relationship between the equilibrium markups and quality. This requires that the ratio between these markups be neither too small nor too large, and that the fraction of potential customers who are highly sensitive to quality is not too large.
Proof of Lemma 3. By (1), all those exposed buy in the first period, and first-period profits are (w I H − c L )µ(x) − x. In the second period, all those exposed know the quality, by (1) the optimal second-period price is w I L < w I H , and only indifferent individuals make a repeat purchase. Second-period profits are
Proof of Lemma 4. By (1), only the indifferent individuals among those exposed buy in the first period, and first-period profits
Next, we argue that the optimal second-period price is w I H > w I L , and all those initially exposed buy in the second period. First observe that every exposed indifferent individual knows (by experience) that quality is high and is therefore willing to pay w I H . The exposed fastidious individuals (who have observed the firstperiod price w I L ) must infer that quality is high, if the second-period price is higher than the first-period price. To see this, recall that they know the indifferent individuals know the quality by experience and will be willing to pay a price higher than w I L only for a high-quality product. By Assumption 5, the firm cannot afford to miss out on the purchases of the indifferent individuals. Therefore, it will raise the price above w I L only if it produces high quality. Thus, the fastidious individuals who were initially exposed identify the type of the firm and, consequently, will purchase the product, if the second-period price is w I H . Clearly, by Assumption 5, the firm has no incentive to raise the price above w I H to w F H . Consequently, the firm sets the price w I H , and the second-period profits are (
Proof of Lemma 5. By (1) and Assumption 3, π L H (x) is a strictly concave function with π L H (0) = 0 and
Proof of Lemma 6. We prove part (i). By Lemma 3,
which we can write as
Also, note that by Lemma 2,
24 See Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) for an analysis of quality signalling by competing firms.
Hence, by (A1) and (A2),
which can be written as (
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by considering the general case, λ ≥ 0, and then specialize to λ = 0 when appropriate. So, suppose that ( ∀x ∈ (x, x] . Hence, the incentive-compatibility condition for the high-quality firm holds in this case.
Next, suppose that x * ∈ (x, x m H ). Now, incentive compatibility for the high-quality firm requires
By construction, we have
). Using this in (A3), we can rewrite the incentive condition as
Using Lemmas 1 through 4, we can generally write
, which we use in (A4) to obtain
Also, we can write
. Applying this to (A5), we can write the incentive-compatibility constraint of the high-quality firm as 
Hence, the left-hand side of (A6) is strictly positive, and we conclude quite generally that the inequality is satisfied provided that λ(c H − c L )µ(x * ) is sufficiently small.
Turning to the special case with λ = 0, (A6) reduces to
Assumption 5 in the text and p ∈ (w INow observe that L − c L ), which is the first supposition in the proposition. This completes the proof of the second claim. H , x) is observed in the first period such that x ∈ X . Therefore ( p H , x) cannot be an SSSE signal if x ∈ X , since the high-quality firm is better off deviating to w I H where it can still attract all exposed consumers. Suppose therefore that x ∈ (x, x) and
is the profit of the high-quality firm, if it spends x on advertising, sets the first-period price at w F L such that all exposed individuals buy in the first period, and optimally sets the second-period price at w I H such that all exposed individuals buy in the second period. Then 
However, this reverses the condition needed to ensure π H H (x) > π H H (x) (see Lemma 6), and we conclude that the SCC is incompatible with signal reversal.
Q.E.D.
